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Hylton: Intent in Tort Law

2009 Monsanto Lecture
INTENT IN TORT LAW
Keith N. Hylton∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts says that intention in tort law
“is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it
is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of
another in a way that the law will not sanction.”1 The problem with this
description is that it is circular, at least if we view the statement as an
attempt to set out in general terms the type of intent that must be
established to hold a defendant liable in tort. How do we know that
someone has the intent necessary to find his conduct unlawful?
According to Prosser, we see if the actor intended to bring about an
unlawful invasion; where the definition of such an invasion depends on
the actor’s intent.
This Lecture avoids the circularity problem in defining intent. I
argue that intent standards in tort law are objective and serve important
regulatory functions. The intent standards can be explained on the basis
of the incentive effects of tort liability rules.2 Intent standards are easier
to understand if we work backwards from an understanding of the
desired impact of the rules to the language of the rules themselves.
The core of my argument is that intent rules work primarily as
pricing mechanisms that internalize costs optimally, in the sense that
they induce potential tortfeasors to choose the option that is least costly
to society.
The intent standard for battery discourages socially
undesirable acts and at the same time avoids discouraging socially
beneficial activity. The intent standard for assault is more difficult to
satisfy than that for battery, and because of this, it encourages (or avoids
discouraging) the speech that is often intermixed with potentially
threatening conduct. The intent standards for cases of economic
∗

Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu. This
Lecture was prepared for the 2009 Monsanto Lecture, Valparaiso University, April 23, 2009.
I thank Ken Simons for detailed comments on an early draft.
1
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (West, 4th ed. 1971).
2
This Lecture’s focus on incentives and regulatory function can be contrasted with noneconomic theories of intention in tort law. See John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Peter Cane,
Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 533 (2000); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992).
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predation (inducement of breach of contract, unfair competition) reflect
the same effort to discourage socially harmful acts without deterring
desirable activity. In addition to the optimal internalization goal,
transaction costs play a role in the specification of intent requirements.
The subtle difference between the intent requirements for trespass and
battery can be explained on the basis of transaction costs.
As a preliminary matter, internalization for its own sake is not a
desirable goal for the law.3 Internalization is desirable because it
discourages socially harmful conduct, or in other words, contributes to
the ideal level of deterrence.4 My argument means the same if one were
to substitute “optimal deterrence” or “optimal regulation” in place of
“optimal internalization” wherever the words occur below. I focus on
the word internalization because that is the easiest way to think about
the immediate effects of intent rules.
II. INTENTIONAL TORTS: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Theories of intent in tort law are either subjectivist or objectivist. The
subjectivist approaches, which have been explored more seriously in the
criminal law than in the torts literature, appear to be grounded
ultimately in Kantian theory.5 Under the subjectivist approach to
intentional torts, the law aims to punish tortfeasors for intentionally or at
least knowingly violating norms that are implicit in the law. Those
3
I especially want to distinguish the approach taken here from one version of the
corrective justice approach, that of Jules Coleman. Coleman’s view of corrective justice is
that it requires nothing more than the annulment of unjust gains and losses. See Jules L
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 357 (1992). While it
might be unfair to describe this approach as internalization for its own sake, it lacks a
functional basis for the internalization goal. The basis for internalization in Coleman’s
theory is the Aristotelian premise that unjust impositions should be cancelled. Since only
unjust impositions are to be cancelled (not all impositions) it follows that the core problem
in Coleman’s theory is determining the meaning of justice.
4
The ideal or optimal level of deterrence is assumed to be determined by the familiar
Hand Formula (or Learned Hand analysis), evaluated with complete accuracy. Under the
Hand Formula, forbearance on the part of the injurer is socially desirable whenever the
burden of forbearance is less than the loss that would otherwise be imposed on victims. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). I assume below that
intentional torts do not confer a long run evolutionary benefit, as they may have in the
distant past. See generally KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans.,
1963). If intentional torts conferred a long run evolutionary benefit, then punishment
appears to be less desirable. However, whatever long-run benefits were secured through
the aggressive instinct, those benefits have tapered off quite substantially by now. Treating
the external evolutionary benefits of aggression as essentially zero is not a serious error.
5
See generally R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1990); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993).
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norms, in turn, reflect the view that it is morally objectionable if an actor
uses others as a means to his own ends or fails to respect their
autonomy.6 It follows that the actor’s true mental state is important in
determining the appropriateness of liability.
The objectivist approach, in contrast, views mental state as having a
weak relevance at best to the appropriateness of punishment. Legal
standards are external to or exogenous with respect to the actor’s mental
state. The characterization of an actor’s mental state plays a role, if
necessary, in designing an optimal regulatory system, but there is
certainly no requirement under the objective approach to identify the
true mental state of the actor as a primitive input in the process of
determining liability.
The objectivist literature in tort law begins with Holmes’s treatment
of the legal standards governing intent in the first three chapters of The
Common Law.7 The first chapter, on criminal law, examines intent
standards for crimes. Holmes argues that intent is reducible to
knowledge of facts that allows the average person to foresee the harm his
actions will inflict on another. Thus, a criminal defendant could be
found to have had intent to murder even though he did not really intend
to kill. For example, if an individual leaves an infant out in the cold
alone without food, he could be deemed to have acted with intent to
murder even though he may have sincerely hoped that someone would
find and care for the infant.
In addition to the objectivist definition of intent, which reduces it to
knowledge of certain facts, the intent standard functions according to
Holmes as an index of the probability of harm, in the sense that it allows
courts to convict actors for otherwise innocent acts on the theory that
those acts were likely to lead to immediate serious injury. For example,
an actor can be convicted for attempted murder when the facts indicate
an intent to follow through to the point of committing murder.
6
Richard Epstein, in his early period as a corrective justice proponent, argued that tort
liability is presumptively strict because most torts involve an invasion (i.e., without
consent) of autonomy. See Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 391–
92 (1975). Charles Fried, a corrective justice proponent, took the view that liability should
be presumptively based on negligence because an effort to use others for your purposes
inevitably necessitated an unfair extraction from a hypothetical aggregate social risk
budget. See CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 137 (1970). Ernest Weinrib’s corrective justice theory is centered, like Fried’s, on
the existence of an implicit social contract. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, TOWARD A MORAL
THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE LAW, IN JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND TORT LAW 123 (Michel D. Bayles &
Bruce Chapman eds., 1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV.
485, 491 (1989). However, while Fried’s theory draws heavily on Rawls, Weinrib is more
faithful to Kantian theory.
7
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (A.B.A. 2009) (1881).
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The Common Law’s second and third chapters, both on torts, continue
with the argument that intent can be reduced to knowledge of facts that
allows the ordinary person to foresee the harm his actions could cause.
The intent standard necessary to trigger liability for trespass is especially
low, or even trivial, Holmes suggests, because all that is necessary for
liability is an act that interferes with someone else’s property rights.
And to refer to something as an act implies that it is done with intent.
One does not ordinarily refer to the involuntary contraction of muscles
observed in a seizure as an act.
One important position from Holmes that I adopt is that intent
standards are objective, in the sense that they do not depend on what
was actually in the mind of the defendant when he acted. It is clear in
the case of trespass that one can be found liable for it even though there
was no intent to trespass. The double-effect problem is a concern to
subjectivist scholars, but has not had any impact on the law of
intentional torts.8 The standard for assault requires intent to harm or to
put someone in fear of immediate harm. This can also be satisfied by an
actor who did not really intend to harm or to frighten anyone. For
example, if A points an unloaded gun at B, he could be held liable for
assault even though he sincerely, though erroneously, believed that B
knew that the gun was unloaded.
After Holmes, utilitarian analysis of intent standards does not
appear in the literature again until Posner’s article on wounding to
protect property and Epstein’s article on intentional harms.9 Posner’s
article provided a cost-benefit (efficiency) justification for the law
governing privileges to use deadly force to protect property. Epstein’s
article, in part a reaction to Posner, rejects any attempt to use cost-benefit
analysis to understand the law on intentional torts. Though Epstein’s
approach, grounded in Kantian theory, is quite different from that taken
here, his discussion is one of the first efforts to provide a rationale for the
variation in intent standards observed in tort law. Under Epstein’s
analysis, a prima facie case for strict liability is established by the
defendant’s unauthorized or nonconsensual touching of the plaintiff.

See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort:
The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2001). The double-effect
problem arises when someone takes an action that may harm the victim but also may
produce another effect, such as the brush-back pitch in baseball. The pitcher may not want
to harm the batter at all, but is aware that the batter might be injured as a result of this
effort to prevent the batter from encroaching on the strike zone. See Kimberly Ferzan,
Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2008).
9
See generally Epstein, supra note 6; Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a
Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971).
8
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Posner returned to the intent question in an article with William
Landes in 1981.10 They used the Hand Formula’s comparison of the
burden of precaution with avoided harms to explain why tort law
imposes strict liability for intentional torts. Under the Hand Formula, a
failure to adopt a specific precaution is unreasonable if the burden of the
precaution is less than the harms that would have been avoided by its
adoption. According to Landes and Posner, the burden of avoiding the
harm is especially small in the case of intentional torts—in fact, negative,
since the tortfeasor saves on effort by doing nothing rather than
attempting to kill his neighbor. Since the burden of precaution is
extremely low (negative) and the likelihood of harm substantial, they
argued that it follows that strict liability should apply as a general rule to
intentional torts.
An important potential flaw in Landes and Posner’s reasoning was
later exposed by Dorsey Ellis.11 When you choose not to take your
neighbor’s property, Ellis suggested, the burden of precaution
(forbearance) is not negative. The burden of precaution is the disutility
you experience by forgoing the taking. If you had expected to enjoy
great benefits as a result of expropriating your neighbor’s property then
the burden of precaution is positive after all. And if you expected
unusually great benefits from the expropriation, say because his
property is much more valuable in your hands than in his, then the
burden of precaution may exceed the avoided losses. Hence, it does not
follow immediately from the Hand Formula, according to Dorsey, that
all intentional torts are instances of inefficient conduct.
Landes and Posner returned to the intentional torts question in their
book The Economic Structure of Tort Law.12 Rather than refer to the
burden of precaution, they say that liability for an intentional tort is
implied by two factors: the likelihood of harm, and the burden of
avoiding it. Intent is inferred, according to Landes and Posner, when the
probability of harm is very high or when the cost of avoiding the harm,
for a given probability of occurring, is extremely low. One clear case of
intent is where the actor punches the victim in the nose; the probability
of harm is high, and given that the actor must have been aware of it, we
should infer intent. The other case of intent involves a low probability of
harm but also a very low cost of avoidance; for example, someone stands

10
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional
Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981).
11
See generally Dorsey Ellis, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1983).
12
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987).
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over a highway dropping bricks down toward the pavement. If the
traffic is sparse, his actual probability of hitting a car may be low. On the
other hand, since it was easy to avoid any harm to a driver in this setting,
the actor should be said to have intended the harm if it occurs even
though the probability was low.
Landes and Posner’s second description of their rationale for the
intent standard, as a basis for strict liability, avoids Dorsey’s criticism
and remains consistent with the Hand Formula as it has been applied by
courts.13 However, as a theory of strict liability for intentional torts, it
remains incomplete. If a man suffering from starvation steals bread from
his neighbor after the neighbor refuses to give it to him, he is still guilty
of a trespass even though the burden of avoiding the intentional tort is
very high.14 Moreover, unlike Holmes, and unlike Epstein, Landes and
Posner make no effort to justify the different intent standards observed
in tort law. Their treatment of intentional torts makes no distinctions
between the intent necessary to trigger liability under trespass, battery,
and assault.
Landes and Posner’s approach might be seen as consistent with
Holmes’s because Holmes claimed that intent could almost always be
reduced to knowledge of facts. But the facts necessary to trigger liability
differ among the various types of intentional tort. For example, to be
liable for trespass, one need only know that he is walking on land—there
is no need for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant knew that he was
on someone else’s land. Assault, on the other hand, requires the
defendant to know more facts to be liable. The defendant must know
facts that would allow the ordinary person, if carrying out the same acts,
to infer that his conduct would harm someone or put someone in
immediate fear of harm.
Intent requirements vary in substance as well as form across
intentional tort categories. I will explain the variations in those
requirements, starting with the minimal intent standard for trespass, and
the close, though somewhat higher, standard for battery. I will then
explain the standards for assault and other torts involving intent to
harm. However, before launching into these explanations, I describe the
levels of intent implied by the cases.

13
This is not the same as the perfectly accurate evaluation referred to in note 4 supra
because it makes no attempt to take individual idiosyncratic features into account. In other
words, the Hand analysis is not quite the same thing as an unalloyed efficiency test.
14
The theft-of-bread example cannot be treated, in an effort to rescue the Landes-Posner
theory, as a case of high subjective disutility, where the objective social cost of avoidance is
low (or negative). In any moderately responsible accounting of objective costs, the cost of
death from starvation would be incorporated.
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III. LEVELS OF INTENT
There are essentially four levels of intent in tort law. They can be
arranged along a spectrum from involuntary conduct to acts carried out
with the sole purpose of harming someone.
A. Involuntary
The involuntary conduct category consists of acts that are not
planned or controlled by the actor or injurer. For example, a sudden
seizure causes the injurer to punch the victim in the nose. Or, the injurer
is riding on a horse, the horse throws him, and he flies into the air and
lands on the victim, or lands on the victim’s property. In these examples,
the injury is not the result of some planned, intended, or controlled act.15
It is the result of a force, internal or external, that the injurer could not
control.
B. Primary Volitional
Primary volitional conduct involves acts that are controlled by the
actor, but in which the actor is not aware of or cannot foresee the
immediate physical consequences of his action.16
How could this happen? Consider the battery context first. One
example is where the actor suffers from some form of insanity that
makes him unaware of his immediate surroundings.17 Suppose, for
example, he grabs the arm of a bystander, thinking he is actually in the
process of opening a door. In this case, the actor is aware of his own
physical movements; he is aware and intends to be in the process of
grabbing something and moving it. However, he is unable to determine
accurately the object that is being affected by his action. Another
example is that of a child too immature to know the immediate
15
See, e.g., Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199–200 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1941)
(defendant jumped out of cab to avoid armed robber, cab ran into plaintiff); Lobert v. Pack,
9 A.2d 365, 366 (1939) (defendant, asleep in back seat of car, kicked seat causing plaintiff to
crash). See generally Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (defendant carried onto
plaintiff’s property by others); MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 97–103
(1994).
16
“Immediate physical consequences” should be distinguished from “incapacity to
realize the probable consequences” used by Bohlen. See Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort
of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 9 (1924). The “incapacity to realize
probable consequences” description could apply to someone who understands the
immediate physical consequences (physical contact) but not the likely result (injury).
17
Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338, 338 (1972) (defendant shot plaintiff while
suffering from insane delusion that the plaintiff was not a person and that plaintiff was
assaulting him).
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consequences of certain physical conditions.18 For example, the child is
unaware of the laws of gravity, so he does not know that he will fall
from a table as he runs off the side of it. Or suppose the child pulls the
chair away as a person is about to sit, but the child is too immature to
foresee the immediate consequence that the victim will fall to the
ground.
Yet another example is the case of someone who yawns, stretching
his hands out, unaware that his fist will hit a passerby. If the actor is not
aware of anyone near him,19 then this falls within the primary volitional
category. If the actor is aware that others are nearby and may be hit by
his fist, then this is clearly a case of foreseeable harm and outside of the
primary volitional category.
In the trespass setting, primary volitional conduct involves a
crossing of the boundary to someone’s property in which the actor is
aware that he is walking but does so without an awareness of his
physical surroundings. Suppose, for example, the actor is sleepwalking
or walking under some hypnotic trance. The actor sees a completely
different landscape from that which is really before him.
C. Secondary Volitional
Secondary volitional conduct involves actors who are aware of and
can foresee the immediate physical consequences of their acts. It helps to
distinguish the battery and trespass cases.
In the battery case, a secondary volitional actor knows that as he
stretches his fist toward the victim’s nose, it will come into contact with
the victim. If he knows this and nothing else, he is at the secondary
volitional level and this is so even if he cannot foresee that the contact
will cause an injury such as a broken nose. Vosburg v. Putney provides
an example of a defendant whose intent was at the secondary volitional
level.20 When George Putney kicked Andrew Vosburg in the knee, he
apparently did not intend or foresee any harm, especially not the severe
damage later attributed to the kick by the plaintiff.

18
See, e.g., Walker v. Kelly, 314 A.2d 785, 788 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973) (upholding trial
court’s finding that, although five-year-old girl threw rock that hit plaintiff’s forehead, she
did not intend to strike plaintiff with rock); see also Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 306
(Colo. 1974) (defendants, three- and four-year-old children, apparently pushed a five-weekold baby off a bed, causing severe head injuries). In Horton, the court held that the
defendants were not liable for battery. Id. at 308.
19
See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 292 (1850) (defendant, walking backwards as
he tried to separate fighting dogs, hit plaintiff in eye with stick); Moe v. Steenberg, 147
N.W.2d 587, 588 (Minn. 1966) (defendant, skating backward, ran into plaintiff) .
20
50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
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Another example is the act of pulling a chair away as the victim is
trying to sit in it. The secondary volitional actor knows the immediate
physical consequence: the victim will fall. Thus, in Garratt v. Dailey, the
five-year old boy who pulled the chair from under Ms. Garratt before she
sat down probably understood that Ms. Garratt would suffer some
contact with the ground.21 It does not matter that he may not have
foreseen that Ms. Garratt would fracture her hip. It is sufficient for the
secondary volitional intent level that the injurer was aware that there
would be some possibly unpleasant physical contact.
In the trespass setting, secondary volitional conduct means being
aware of the physical surroundings. A secondary volitional actor need
not know that he has crossed the boundary to another’s property.
However, he is aware of his physical surroundings. Unlike the primary
volitional, he sees what is really before him.
D. Tertiary Volitional: Foresight and Intent
An actor who meets the tertiary volitional level of intent foresees or
intends the immediate harm or ultimate physical consequence of his
actions. This statement is obviously unclear and needs to be fleshed out
with examples. Consider the foresight case first. In the battery context, a
tertiary volitional actor foresees that his punch will harm the victim. He
does not necessarily foresee that his punch will lead through a complex
chain of events to some great loss, such as death. However, he is aware
of some plausible injuries that are likely to occur, such as a bruised face.
In the trespass context, a tertiary volitional actor is aware that he is
crossing the boundary of another’s property. He knows that the
property owner will regard his crossing as a trespass.
A more extreme case is where the tertiary volitional actor wants or
intends to harm the victim. For example, the actor foresees that his
punch in the nose will lead to immediate physical injury to the victim
and wants this to occur. Or the actor pulls the chair away as the victim is
about to sit, hoping to cause injury to the victim. In the trespass context,
a tertiary volitional actor may not only foresee that his actions will result
in a trespass, but also aim to trespass on the victim's property. For
example, in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,22 the defendant was warned
279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955), appeal after remand, 304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956).
563 N.W.2d 154, 156–57 (Wis. 1997). Jacque returns us to the distinction between
subjectivist and objectivist inquiries. To a subjectivist, it is important that the defendant in
Jacque did not have a desire to harm the plaintiffs; he only wanted to save money by cutting
across their property. To the objectivist, this distinction is irrelevant because the defendant
knew that the intentional (“in your face”) trespass was a direct by-product of his decision
to save money by cutting across the plaintiff’s property.

21
22
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against trespassing on the plaintiff’s property but did so anyway in order
to reduce the costs of delivering a mobile home to a customer.
E. Implementation of Intent Standards
In defining the terms primary volitional and secondary volitional, I
implicitly assume that courts have no way of determining the thoughts
inside someone’s head. In every case, the level of intent is inferred from
the facts. If the facts are such that the average person would not have
acted in the way the defendant did, knowing what the defendant must
have known, unless he intended to harm the victim or at least was
content with harming the victim as a step toward some other goal, then a
court will infer intent to harm. In this sense, all of the intent standards
defined so far are assumed to be objective.
IV. EXPLAINING INTENT REQUIREMENTS
When we say that liability for intentional torts is strict, the first
question that must be answered is: what sort of intent? If we regard
intentional conduct as equivalent to voluntary conduct, then it is clear from the
foregoing that liability is not strict for every intentional tort. Strict liability
applies only to those intentional torts that fall in the secondary and tertiary
volitional categories.
In general, tort liability requires as a minimum the secondary
volitional level of intent, which means knowledge or foresight of the
immediate physical consequences of an act. Actors who satisfy the
secondary and tertiary volitional levels may be held liable for
compensatory damages under tort law, and those who satisfy the tertiary
level may be held liable in addition for punitive damages. Criminal law,
on the other hand, requires the highest intent level in order to punish.
The distinctions between intent levels can also be described in terms of
the familiar labels “general intent” and “specific intent,” where
secondary volitional describes cases of general intent, which is sufficient
for tort liability, and tertiary volitional includes cases of specific intent,
which is a requirement for criminal liability.
Among the standard intentional tort claims, the level of intent
necessary to hold a defendant liable varies according to the type of claim.
Battery, trespass, and false imprisonment require awareness of
immediate physical consequences—the secondary volitional level.23
Assault requires intent to harm or to put one in fear of harm, which
23
Recent developments in tort doctrine have not altered this long-standing feature of the
case law. For a review with interesting observations on theory, see Kenneth W. Simons, A
Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2006).
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implies the tertiary volitional level of intent. The same holds for an
“offensive battery,” of the sort that might subject the actor to punitive
damages.24 Defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims also require the highest level of intent.25
Why does tort law require awareness of immediate physical consequences as
a minimum component of an intentional tort claim, and why do intent
standards vary according to the type of intentional tort, and even within some
categories of intentional tort (e.g., battery)? These questions are addressed
below.
A. Secondary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement for Intentional
Tort Liability: Trespass and Battery
Awareness of immediate physical consequences, which I have
described as secondary volitional conduct, is necessary and in most cases
sufficient for tort liability because the law of intentional torts serves
primarily as a pricing mechanism or collection of pricing rules that
internalizes costs optimally. The basic intuition was described by
Holmes in the context of trespass.
When a man goes upon his neighbor’s land, thinking it
his own, he intends the very act or consequence
complained of. He means to intermeddle with a certain
thing in a certain way, and it is just that intended
intermeddling for which he is sued . . . . One who
diminishes the value of property by intentional damage
knows it belongs to somebody. If he thinks it belongs to
himself, he expects whatever harm he may do to come
out of his own pocket. It would be odd if he were to get
rid of the burden by discovering that it belonged to his
neighbor.26
This passage suggests that cost internalization is the aim of the intent
standard for trespass. However, cost internalization is also arguably the
goal of the negligence rule, yet in the case of negligence the law does not
require awareness of immediate physical consequences. The law
Meadows v. Guptill, 856 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1993) (offensive sexual
harassment and touching); Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (battery
and false imprisonment); Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 553 (1872) (spitting in face); Draper
v. Baker, 21 N.W. 527, 528 (Wis. 1884) (same); Jones v. Fisher, 166 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Wis.
1969) (pulling out plaintiff’s dentures).
25
See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 138–40 (on defamation and intent); PROSSER, supra note 1,
at 49–62 (on intentional infliction of emotional distress).
26
HOLMES, supra note 7, at 97.
24

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 8

1228 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

requires foreseeability of harmful consequences. What explains the
different knowledge requirements under trespass and negligence?
The reason awareness of immediate physical consequences is
necessary and generally sufficient for liability under the law of
intentional torts, and not so under negligence law, is that the law triggers
liability at the point at which you become aware, or should become
aware, of the cost that your act will impose on someone. In the case of
intentional conduct, you are aware of the fact that a cost will be imposed
on someone as long as you are aware of the immediate physical
consequences of your act. If you kick someone on the leg, you are aware
that there is a potential cost that will be borne by the person kicked. The
only case where you would be unaware of that potential cost is when
you are not aware of the fact that you are kicking a person. Assuming
you are aware that you are kicking a person, Holmes’s argument applies
directly: if that person is yourself, you will bear the cost yourself; if that
person is another individual, you should not escape the cost, if
internalization is indeed the goal of the law, by discovering that fact.
One might argue that the costs of intentional torts would be
internalized just as well by a rule that triggers liability for battery at the
primary volitional level, when the actor is in control of his physical
motions though unaware of any immediate physical consequences. For
example, suppose the actor, for all he can see, is standing alone in the
desert. He yawns, stretching out his hand, and punches a sudden visitor
in the nose. In this case, his intent level satisfies the primary volitional
standard but not the secondary volitional standard. Because a rule
triggering liability at the primary volitional level would clearly lead to
liability in the secondary volitional level cases as well, all of the costs of
intentional conduct would be internalized under it.
While it is true that the costs of intentional conduct would be
internalized under the primary volitional standard, those costs would
not be internalized optimally. A primary volitional actor has no reason to
perceive that his action will impose a cost on anyone. Given this,
liability would have no effect on his actions, other than to encourage him
to stay inside his home alone. Because such a general discouragement of
activity is undesirable, using the primary volitional level as the
triggering point for liability under the law of intentional torts does not
internalize costs optimally. The same argument obviously applies if the
law provided no exemption for involuntary conduct.
The tertiary volitional standard also fails to internalize costs
optimally. The reason is that under the tertiary volitional standard, the
actor would not be held liable unless the facts suggested that he was
aware that he would harm or intended to harm the victim. Under this

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/8

Hylton: Intent in Tort Law

2010]

Intent in Tort Law

1229

rule, there would be a vast set of batteries and trespasses that would be
excused from liability. For example, the five-year-old boy in Garratt v.
Dailey who pulled the chair from under Ms. Garratt could not be held
liable under the tertiary volitional intent standard because he was not
aware that he would harm Ms. Garratt. The same holds in the doubleeffect scenario: for example, an orange rolls out of a door onto the
sidewalk and the injurer, in order to get the orange and worried that the
victim would get it first, pushes the victim out of the way. Similarly, the
trespasser who digs up your property, thinking it his own, would avoid
liability under the tertiary volitional standard. Since it would be far
cheaper to reduce the value of someone else’s property rather than your
own, we should expect frequent “unintended” trespasses under this rule.
Many of them would reduce society’s wealth because the trespasser’s
gain would be less than the loss imposed.27
The upshot is that of the four potential intent standards identifiable
in the case law—involuntary, primary volitional, secondary volitional,
and tertiary volitional—the secondary volitional standard appears to be
the only one capable of internalizing the costs of intentional torts such as
battery and trespass in a manner that induces actors to choose the least
costly option to society. The secondary volitional standard regulates (or
deters) optimally because it holds the injurer strictly liable for costs he
imposes on others when he is aware of their imposition, and therefore,
leaves the injurer with an incentive to impose those costs only when his
benefits exceed them. The secondary volitional standard avoids overinternalization, or over-deterrence, by excusing the injurer from liability
for the costs his acts impose on others when he is not (and has no reason
to be) aware of their imposition and thereby avoids general
discouragement of benign activity.
Now consider negligent conduct. You are shooting your arrow at a
target. The immediate target of your action is not another individual.
But an individual runs across the path of your arrow as you shoot. By
assumption, you were not aware when you shot the arrow that there
would be an immediate physical consequence to another individual.
However, the question that arises in the negligence context is whether
you should have foreseen the risk of a third party running across the
path of your arrow. If so, then you should have foreseen that a cost
would be imposed on a third party. Negligence law allows you to avoid
liability only under the condition that the burden of avoiding that harm
To be sure, the negligence rule would remain in the background to be used against the
injurer in these cases, but it would be a strange and unstable regime if the injurer had valid
defenses against the obvious intentional tort, but could still be found liable on a negligence
theory for the same conduct.

27
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to a third party was extremely high. Of course, in this example, the
burden is low (simply aim your arrow in a different direction or hold
your fire) so foreseeability will be sufficient for liability.
My point in comparing negligent conduct to intentional conduct is
not to reexamine the benefit-burden balancing of the Hand Formula.28 It
is to show that foreseeability of harm, a more demanding knowledge
requirement than “awareness of immediate physical consequences,” is a
necessary condition (though not always sufficient in view of the Hand
Formula) for liability under negligence law. The foresight of harm
standard is more demanding because it requires the actor to know a
more complicated set of facts about the circumstances surrounding his
conduct. This is not to say that the actor who foresees the harm is
necessarily aware of the immediate physical consequences; he may not
be. An actor may be able to foresee the harm to a third party without
being aware of the immediate physical consequences of his act, as in the
arrow shooter example just discussed.
This comparison between intentional and negligent conduct
illustrates the connection between the theory presented here and
Holmes’s theory of intent standards. Recall that Holmes said that intent
reduces to knowledge of facts that allows the typical person to foresee
the harm resulting from his actions. It follows from this, and Holmes
demonstrated, that when the likelihood of harm is very high
(approaching one), as in the case of an intentional tort, the requisite
knowledge of facts (necessary to foresee harm) is correspondingly low.
When the likelihood of harm is not very high, the requisite knowledge of
facts is correspondingly high, which applies to the case of negligence.
The argument presented here is consistent with Holmes. The key
innovation in this argument is the explanation for the intent standard.

28
However, my argument has implications for the interpretation of the Hand Formula.
The argument implies that the Hand Formula can be broken into a two-part analysis that
begins with foreseeability and then considers burden. It often ends with foreseeability too.
The question of burden becomes relevant only when it is clear that the defendant foresaw
or should have foreseen harm to a third party or to property. The analysis often ends with
foresight because plaintiffs bring negligence claims only in those cases where the burden of
the proposed precaution is relatively small. One implication of this argument is that there
will be relatively few cases, in the sample of those reaching judgment, that actually
examine the burden of precaution. It follows that claims that the role of burden is
exaggerated in the Hand analysis are of questionable validity. Weinrib, for example, has
made this assertion. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 148–50 (1995). I find
unpersuasive Weinrib’s claim that the English and Commonwealth approaches to
negligence reveal a reluctance, in contrast to the American approach, to consider the
burden of precaution. The American and English approaches appear to be the same. And
the screening process that rational parties will implement in the litigation process will
produce a sample of cases in which the burden of precaution is rarely considered.
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The foregoing account of the intent standard provides a way of
reconciling the seemingly conflicting results in the battery cases
involving children as defendants.29 In Vosburg v. Putney, George Putney
was held liable to Andrew Vosburg for the unexpectedly severe harm
attributed to his kick. One lesson often drawn from Vosburg v. Putney is
that intent to harm or foresight of harm is not a requirement for liability
under battery doctrine. However, in Horton v. Reaves, the infant
defendants, three- and four-year-old children, were not held liable for
severe head injuries to a five-week old baby that they had roughhandled while the baby’s mother was away.30 These seemingly
conflicting results can be reconciled under the view that liability for
battery requires awareness on the part of the injurer that his act will
impose a cost on someone (secondary volitional intent). George Putney
was almost twelve years old when he kicked Andrew Vosburg, old
enough to know that a kick could harm someone. The infant defendants
in Horton v. Reaves, though aware of their own physical acts, were not
aware of the potential harm to the baby.
B. Variation of Intent Standards within the Class of Basic Intentional Torts:
The Role of Transaction Costs
Secondary volitional conduct, in the sense of being aware of the
immediate physical consequences of one’s action, is a necessary
condition for liability for intentional conduct. The reason is that tort law
functions as a pricing mechanism that internalizes costs optimally. The
intent standard that serves this pricing role best in the intentional torts
case is the secondary volitional level. In this part, I argue that
transaction costs play a role in determining whether the secondary
volitional requirement is a sufficient as well as necessary condition for
liability.
Although secondary volitional conduct is generally necessary for
liability in the intentional torts context, it is not always sufficient. In
general, the intent requirement is a little higher for battery than for
trespass. There is a well understood exception for liability in the case of
a touching that is generally treated as a pleasantry.31 For example, if a
See, e.g., Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (Colo. 1974); Walker v. Kelly, 314 A.2d
785, 788 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1973); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).
30
The apparent conflict between Vosburg v. Putney and Horton v. Reaves is noted in
GRADY, supra note 15, at 108.
31
E.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (“[A]ny unlawful or
unauthorized touching of the person of another, except it be in the spirit of pleasantry,
constitutes assault and battery.”). However, the pleasantry exception does not extend to
the case in which the defendant acts against the objections of the plaintiff in order to do
something that he thinks is best for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Clayton v. New Dreamland
29
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law partner pats an associate on the back to congratulate the associate for
her work, most people would regard that touching as a pleasantry. If, by
some bizarre chain of events, the associate’s shoulder fell off after the
touch, the associate would have a difficult time prevailing on a battery
claim because of the pleasantry exception. In short, the secondary
volitional standard is necessary for batteries, but not always sufficient.
I am aware of no such pleasantry exception in trespass law. If A
wanders over to B’s property and rearranges his flowers on the theory
that the new arrangement will be more to B’s liking, A will be found
guilty of trespass. This is so even if A knows B’s preferences and is
correct in his view that his arrangement will be preferred by B over the
old flower arrangement. The level of intent required by trespass is just
an intention to have the immediate physical consequence, which is to be
on B’s land. There is no requirement that A intend to hurt B in any way
and no exception for “pleasant trespasses.” As a result, the secondary
volitional requirement is both necessary and sufficient for trespass
liability.
Why do we observe this subtle difference between the intent
standards for trespass and battery? The reason is transaction costs,
which are higher in the battery than in the trespass context. Think of
what happens in the battery context. Many batteries arise in the course
of spontaneous social interaction. The law partner walks over to the
associate and pats him on the back. B taps C on the shoulder to get his
attention. Although the conduct is intentional, there is no time for the
actor to seek permission from the person acted on. To seek such
permission in all cases would ground a good deal of social interaction to
a halt.
Trespasses to real property, in contrast, do not typically arise out of
the context of spontaneous social interaction. It is much easier, in
general, than in the battery context for the actor to seek permission from
the property owner before crossing the boundary. Nothing requires A to
act immediately to rearrange the flowers on B’s property. A can contact
B first and seek permission.
Of course, trespass law makes exceptions in the cases where A had to
act quickly with good reasons. A ship owner who ties his boat to B’s
dock in order to prevent it from being blown away in a storm does not
have time to seek permission before using B’s property. The law makes
an exception by giving the ship owner a necessity defense to the trespass

Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951) (defendant liable for battery
when defendant, over objections of plaintiff, manipulated plaintiff’s broken arm with the
intention of aligning it correctly).
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charge.32 The necessity argument typically arises in settings where
transaction costs prevent negotiation from taking place before the actor
uses another person’s property. However, the exception provided by the
necessity defense does not affect the liability of the actor who uses
another person’s property. The existence of a necessity defense does not
absolve the actor from liability.33
Because the transaction costs of seeking permission are lower in the
trespass than in the battery context, the intent standard is also lower in
the trespass context. The reason is that the law encourages potential
trespassers to seek permission and, if necessary, bargain for access rather
than invading someone’s property. Overall social costs are lower if
people seek consent and if necessary pay for access to private property,
rather than invade and compel property owners to litigate in order to
enforce their entitlements.
Even within the battery context, intent standards vary. In Mohr v.
Williams,34 a doctor was held liable for battery for operating on the
patient’s left ear, when he had told the patient that he would operate on
the right. One could make the case that the doctor’s conduct should fall
within the pleasantry exception for batteries. The doctor’s decision took
place under a high-transaction cost setting, since the patient had been
anesthetized, and it was intended to leave the patient better off than she
was before the operation. That these arguments were insufficient to
avoid liability for battery suggests that the triggering point for liability in
medical intervention cases is lower than that for ordinary batteries. The
secondary volitional standard—awareness of immediate physical
consequences—is both necessary and sufficient for liability in the
medical invasion case.
The transaction cost rationale serves as an adequate explanation for
the relatively low intent standard for medical invasions. In general, the
costs of seeking permission for the precise invasion intended are low in
the medical context. The physician simply has to disclose his plans to
the patient and seek consent. Given the low cost of seeking consent, the
intent standard sufficient for liability should also be low, as in the
trespass setting. Setting the intent standard low gives doctors, as well as
trespassers, incentives to bargain first rather than invade, or to use the

32
Vincent v. Lake Erie, 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189
(Vt. 1908).
33
Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222.
34
104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905).
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market rather than take, which is a central goal of much of the common
law.35
As in the trespass setting, there are events that justify medical
invasions where the physician has not received consent. The most
common is the case of emergency, which traditionally required a risk of
death or serious injury to justify the nonconsensual invasion. The
emergency exception was expanded in Kennedy v. Parrot36 to allow a
specific type of nonconsensual invasion, extensions of surgical
operations within the area of the original incision, when the benefits of
the operation clearly outweighed the costs of postponing it. In both its
traditional form and in the Kennedy v. Parrot version, the emergency
defense involves a setting where transaction costs prevent the physician
from gaining consent before the invasion. The patient is typically under
anesthesia already and the physician discovers that some nonconsensual
invasion is necessary in order to prevent a serious injury to the patient.
Although the transaction cost theory helps explain both the low
intent standard for battery liability in the medical context, and the
existence of the emergency defense, it also implies that the emergency
defense should narrow in the present and future. As medical technology
progresses, the cost of gaining consent to all possible invasions
connected to any planned surgery falls. Physicians can use x-rays,
magnetic resonance imaging, and ultrasound to see inside a patient’s
body and obtain the information necessary to foresee all of the surgical
procedures that might be desirable. Because the costs of gaining consent
to all foreseeable surgical procedures are falling, the courts should be
less forgiving of nonconsensual invasions that are claimed by the
physician to be justified under the emergency defense.37

35
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098 (1972); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1229 (1985). See
generally Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. L. & ECON.
137 (2006).
36
90 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C. 1956) (during appendectomy, physician discovered cysts on
plaintiff’s left ovary, which he punctured without plaintiff’s consent.)
37
However, there is a factor that operates to increase transaction costs, even as
technology works to reduce uncertainty. As medical technology permits physicians to
better foresee all desirable surgical procedures, it also gives them the ability to foresee all of
the possible problems and contingencies. The result could be an “information overload” in
which physicians find it prohibitively costly to both predict and explain all of the
sequences of events that might arise during surgery.
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C. Tertiary Volitional Conduct as a Minimum Requirement of Tort Liability
The tertiary volitional intent requirement—foreseeability of or intent
to harm—applies to a broad class of intentional torts including assault,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Foreseeability of harm or intent to harm is a necessary condition for
liability within this class of torts. This is a higher intent standard than
that for trespass. For simplicity, I focus on the standard for assault.
The reason that the intent standard for assault requires more in
terms of knowledge and awareness than that for battery is to avoid overinternalization of costs (or, equivalently, over-regulation, or overdeterrence). Over-internalization means a level of internalization that
over-deters or over-regulates the underlying activity by pushing it to a
level such that the benefits forgone by constraining the activity exceed
the costs avoided.
To see the argument, compare the standard for assault to the
standard for battery. Recall that the assault standard requires intent to
harm or to put one in fear of immediate harm. Why not simply require
the same intent level as battery—namely, the secondary volitional (or
“awareness of immediate physical consequences”) standard?
Suppose the intent standard for assault were the same as that for
battery. The first difficulty is determining what it would mean to apply
the secondary volitional standard to assault. It would be unworkable if a
court held that intent to have immediate physical consequences were
satisfied by a person who stretched his arms out, unaware of anyone else
in his presence, when the other person was put in fear of harm by that
action. At a minimum, the secondary volitional intent level requires
some awareness of an effect on a third person. The only workable
version of the secondary volitional standard in the context of assault
would be one that finds the intent requirement satisfied when the
defendant does an act that invades the plaintiff’s “zone of danger.”38 If
we imagine a line drawn around the plaintiff beyond which he is safe
from an immediate battery by the defendant, a defendant would invade
that zone of danger by entering into that space in full awareness that the
plaintiff perceives the invasion.
Suppose, then, that the intent standard for assault required only an
intent to invade the plaintiff’s zone of danger, as just defined. Under this
38
The zone-of-danger test has been developed in the context of claims for damages
connected to the negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel &
Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 514 (Cal. 1963); Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). These
cases permit the plaintiff to recover damages caused by the negligent infliction of
emotional distress if the plaintiff was in the zone of danger, in the sense of being personally
at risk of serious physical injury.
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standard, the plaintiff in Tuberville v. Savage39 probably would have been
guilty of assault, which may have justified the defendant’s battery of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff put his hand on his sword and said to the
defendant, “if it were not assize time, I would not take such language
from you.”40 The court found that the plaintiff had not assaulted the
defendant, so the defendant was held liable for his battery of the
plaintiff.
Although Tuberville supports the proposition that mere words are
insufficient to constitute an assault, we have more than mere words in
the case. We also have the plaintiff putting his hand on his sword while
speaking to the defendant. If the plaintiff had been physically close
enough to the defendant to strike him with the sword, the defendant
may have felt threatened by the combination of words with a hand on
the sword. This presumably satisfies the invasion-of-personal-dangerzone standard hypothesized here. Under an intent standard that
required proof that the defendant intended to invade the victim’s zone of
personal danger, the plaintiff in Tuberville would have been guilty of
assault.
The over-deterrence risk becomes clear once we see that a lower
intent standard for assault—specifically, one approximating the
secondary volitional level by triggering liability when the defendant
violates the plaintiff’s zone of danger—probably would have led to a
different result in Tuberville. The plaintiff’s conduct in Tuberville is
expressive. He wanted to emphasize his point that he found the
defendant’s language insulting by saying that he should not tolerate it
and at the same time putting his hand on his sword. The combination of
emphatic speech and gestures that could be viewed as threatening is
common in ordinary social interaction. A rule that imposed liability on
such conduct would chill a good deal of ordinary speech.
For example, many people have a habit of approaching the opposing
party in the course of a heated argument, as if the physical closeness
would force the opponent to shrink from his position. This combination
of speech and conduct is designed to get the attention of the other party,
but it does so by making him think that there is at least a slight risk of an
assault. A colleague emphasizes his points in arguments at close range
by putting his hand into the shape of a gun and aiming it at the target of
his speech as he makes each of his points. No one is fooled into thinking
that he is about to be shot, but the technique does get the attention of the
listener. These examples involve—for better or for worse—common

39
40
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methods of argument that could result in liability under a low intent
standard for assault.
It remains to explain why it would be undesirable to chill speech,
though the point will be uncontroversial to most and the reason familiar
from the literature. Speech, as a form of information provision, is a
public good. As such, it delivers benefits that are non-rivalrous, in the
sense that they can be shared by many. One standard result of
economics is that non-rivalrous goods tend to be underprovided in
normal market conditions. The law can help to correct this market
failure by adopting liability standards that steer clear of imposing costs
on the provision of information.41 This is the economic case for adopting
liability standards that avoid burdening speech.
Again, the function of liability is to set up a pricing mechanism that
internalizes costs. But there is a background reason for internalizing
costs. That reason is to generate activity that approximates what would
result in an ideal market. I have suggested so far that battery and assault
differ in the sense that speech is a significant component of the activity
that could give rise to assault charges. Because speech is an important
component of the activity, an intent rule that raises the triggering point
for liability under assault higher than that for battery avoids overdeterrence of speech.
Now one could argue on the basis of the foregoing that since battery
often has an expressive component, the tertiary volitional (intent to
harm) standard should be applied to battery in order to avoid
overinternalizing costs. After all, war is simply politics carried out by
other means. I described assault as intermingled with speech, rather
than expression, in order to avoid suggesting that the law should
subsidize any conduct that can be described as expressive.
The problem with the war-as-politics argument is that battery, if it
can be described accurately as expression, is an extremely unproductive
and costly form of it. A person who says “I hate the New York
Yankees,” communicates the idea to others more effectively than
someone who beats up Yankees fans. Battery, as a form of expression, is
so much less effective and more costly than speech that arguments for
subsidizing speech cannot be carried over to the case of expressive
battery.
1.

Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The argument presented so far for applying the tertiary volitional
(intent to harm) standard to assault applies also to the torts of
41

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 262 (1981).
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defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both torts
involve speech.
Defamation involves speech that damages the
reputation of the victim. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
involves speech that harms the victim directly. In both cases, the intent
to harm standard applies.
To be sure, there are differences in the way the intent-to-harm
standard is described in the legal tests for defamation and for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. These differences seem to suggest that
the standards differ from each other and that they perhaps should not be
described as intent-to-harm tests. Still, if one cuts to the core function of
the standards in both cases, it appears fair to treat them as intent-to-harm
standards.
Defamation, for example, has been described as a strict liability tort
(e.g., Prosser) and by others as requiring proof of malice (e.g., Holmes).
The strict liability position asserts that the defendant is strictly liable for
defamation, but has defenses available based on truth and privilege.42
The malice view asserts that the defendant is liable for defamation only if
no defense based on privilege or truth can be successfully asserted, and
in that case, the defendant is deemed to have acted with malice.43 Both
positions say the same thing about defamation, describing the glass as
either half-empty or half-full.
Whether one describes defamation as a strict liability tort or one
based on fault or malice is unimportant. Under either description, the
intent standard that triggers liability is the tertiary volitional (intent to
harm) standard. To see this, suppose it is established that the defendant
has no credible defense based on truth or privilege. The absence of a
privilege means that there is no objective benefit deriving from the
defendant’s defamatory statement to himself, the victim, or some third
party. The reasonable inference is that the defendant made his
defamatory statement for the sole purpose of imposing a loss on the
victim. This is the kind of intent that the tertiary volitional standard
requires.
Suppose a defendant in a defamation action does have a credible
defense based on privilege. That means that even though there was a
substantial and foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, there was also a
substantial benefit to someone. For example, a prospective employer
may have been warned about the plaintiff’s propensity to steal. Since the
defendant was aware of the cost imposed on the plaintiff, the
defendant’s intent level satisfies the secondary volitional standard
because he was aware that a cost would be imposed on someone. Since
42
43
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defamation law holds that mere knowledge that a cost would be
imposed on someone is insufficient for liability, it rejects the secondary
volitional standard applied in the cases of battery and trespass.
Now consider intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Restatement says that in addition to malice or intent to harm, the law
requires extreme or outrageous conduct.44
But these additional
requirements appear to be designed to provide an objective standard or
barrier that prevents unusually sensitive or timid plaintiffs from flooding
the courts with claims of emotional distress. The outrageousness
requirement does not change the intent standard from the tertiary
volitional level to some higher intent level. It is merely an effort to make
the standard administrable.
2.

Economic Harms

This framework applies to the economic harm cases as well. The
tertiary volitional or intent-to-harm standard applies, in the sense that
the actor will not be found liable unless the facts imply that the sole
purpose for his acts was to harm the victim. The reason the tertiary
volitional standard applies is the same as in the case of assault: in order
to avoid deterrence of socially beneficial activity.
Consider tort law’s treatment of economic predation. The most
common types of claims in this area are inducement of breach of
contract, interference with prospective advantage, and unfair
competition. To illustrate the point that the tertiary volitional standard
applies, I consider two of the economic harm cases examined by Epstein
in his study of intentional torts.
In Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor Gow & Company, the
defendant shipowners formed a conspiracy for the purpose of gaining
exclusive control over the shipping of tea from China to England.45 The
defendants offered a rebate on each shipment, which the customer
would forfeit for the entire year if he shipped tea with a firm that was
not a member of the cartel. They also agreed that if any shipper outside
the cartel attempted to compete with them, they would drive the freight
rate to a level that would make it unprofitable. The plaintiff, one of the
firms excluded from the cartel, claimed that the defendants had
intentionally deprived him of his right to ship tea on the China-England
route. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed because:
44
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1966) (noting that one who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm).
45
23 Q.B.D. 598, 598 (1889), aff’d, [1892] A.C. 25.
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there was here no personal intention to do any other or
greater harm to the plaintiffs than such as was
necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the
defendants’ ships the entire tea freights of the ports, a
portion of which would otherwise have fallen to the
plaintiff’s share.46
This was a zero sum game, in the sense that all of the trade would either
go to the defendants or some of the trade would go to the plaintiff. The
court’s conclusion suggests that the defendants would not be held liable
as long as they were trying to ensure that they got all of the trade. On
the other hand, if they took actions that went beyond simply trying to
garner all of the business, the court would have decided in favor of the
plaintiff.
Mogul v. McGregor can be understood as establishing the tertiary
volitional (intent to harm) standard as a requirement for liability in
economic predation cases. The court clearly rejected the secondary
volitional (knowledge of potential harm) standard, since its decision
would allow the defendants to impose a cost on the plaintiff (losing his
business) as long as it was a necessary byproduct of trying to gain as
much business as they could. Mogul v. McGregor implies that defendants
would be held liable for competitive conduct only if the facts suggest
that the sole purpose of the conduct is to harm the plaintiff.
The intent to harm standard is the optimal standard for cases of
predatory competitive conduct. The reason is that a lower standard,
specifically one triggering liability on the basis of knowledge of harm
(secondary volitional), risks imposing liability on every act of
competition. Competition, like speech, is activity that provides spillover
benefits beyond the particular customer who happens to find an item at
an unusually cheap price. Competition pushes a commodity’s price
toward marginal supply cost, which maximizes the difference between
the social benefits of consumption and the resource costs of supply. The
intent standard adopted in Mogul v. McGregor provides a subsidy of a
sort to competitive market activity.
Keeble v. Hickeringill is an example where the defendant was held
liable for economic predation.47 The plaintiff used duck decoys to lure
fowl to his land, to capture and sell. The defendant turned the fowl
away by shooting his gun and was held liable.
Under the hypothesis that the tertiary volitional standard is required
for cases of economic predation, Keeble v. Hickeringill is easily reconciled
46
47

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/8

23 Q.B.D. at 614.
103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1706).
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with Mogul v. McGregor. In Mogul v. McGregor, the defendants’
interference with the plaintiff’s business was a necessary byproduct of
their effort to secure all of the trade to themselves. In Keeble v.
Hickeringill, the defendant set out to destroy the plaintiff’s business;
destruction was the sole purpose of his conduct.
V. ECONOMICS VERSUS CONSENT AS EXPLANATIONS
FOR INTENTIONAL TORT DOCTRINES
As noted, Epstein’s consent-based analysis is the only piece in the
law and economics journals that looks closely at the intent standards
articulated in tort law. His analysis rejects economics as a way of
understanding the law of intentional torts. My effort has been to show
that the economic approach can indeed be used to explain the intent
standards of tort law at a high level of detail.
The consent-based approach seems to have a great deal of
explanatory power when we first focus on the intent standard for
battery. Because the intent level required for liability under battery is
only the secondary volitional level (awareness of contact), one could
argue that liability for battery is based on lack of consent. In other
words, since intent to do harm is not a necessary condition for liability,
one could argue that the essential feature triggering liability is failure to
gain consent.
However, the consent-based approach does not seem to provide an
explanation for the secondary volitional level as the necessary condition
for liability for intentional torts. If lack of consent is the key reason for
liability, then why not hold someone liable for battery even when they
are unaware of the cost imposed on the victim? Why should a person
who stretches out his arm while yawning, and hits another person, be
able to avoid liability for battery if consent is the key to understanding
intentional tort doctrine? If consent is at the source of the law on battery,
why should a person who is thrown from his horse and lands on
someone else be able to avoid liability? Once these questions are
answered, the consent theory needs to explain why intent to harm
(tertiary volitional) is the necessary condition for liability for assault.
In order for a theory based on consent to serve as an adequate
rationale for intentional tort doctrine, it must be coupled with a theory of
fundamental rights, which is part of Epstein’s analysis to be sure. A
theory of fundamental rights, however, forces us to inquire into the
source of these rights, which has been controversial since Bentham. In
the end, there may very well be a good explanation for their source. The
economic approach has the advantage of providing an explanation for
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the rules while avoiding the controversial and daunting task of
specifying a set of a priori fundamental rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
Economic analysis of law has expressed puzzlement at the intent
rules in the law, beginning with Becker’s discussion of criminal law in
1968.48 Under the standard economic approach, which focuses on
internalization of external costs, the actor’s intent would appear to be
irrelevant. External costs should be internalized, or shifted back to the
source, whether or not the actor intended to externalize them.
This Lecture advances the literature by using economic reasoning to
explain the legal rules governing intentional torts. The main lesson is
that if one’s goal is to internalize costs in an optimal manner, intent does
matter. The intent rules of tort law function as a pricing mechanism that
ensures optimal regulation of injury-causing activity.
Optimal
regulation avoids underdeterrence of harmful conduct and
overdeterrence of beneficial activities. A careful look at the various
intent levels identified in tort law suggests that the ones actually used by
courts as necessary conditions for liability appear to perform better than
available alternatives as regulatory devices.

See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. &
ECON. 169 (1968).
48
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